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Introduction 
In 1990, China established its securities market. Only three years later, 
the first hostile takeover took place and succeeded. In the following two 
decades, China witnessed several takeover attempts and the highlight 
case of Vanke vs. Baoneng in 2016 once again captured people's 
attention, calling for the improvement of Chinese takeover law. 
A hostile takeover era is coming. In 2015, the Supreme People's Court 
called off the 10-year ban on private loans between non-financial 
(l) 
institutes, and China Banking Regulatory Commission removed its 
prohibition for merchant banks to fund takeovers. Since then, P2P 
lending and internet insurance instruments began to thrive for the first 
(2) 
time in Chinese history. Meanwhile, the Shanghai Securities Composite 
Index of Chinese stock market plummeted from its peak of 5178.19 in 
June 12th, 2015 to under 3000 in 2016, during which most listed 
(3) 
companies in China lost more than 30% of their market value. The stock 
market is stil in distress in 2017, and the cumulative stock price of 
some ST-companies are close to their bust-up value. The concentrated 
ownership structure in Chinese listed companies was once the biggest 
obstacles for barbarians to knock at the gate, however, the Share Split 
Reform beginning in 2005 made the non-tradable shares of the State 
tradable and gradually reduced the level of ownership concentration in 
(4) 
Chinese listed companies, which paved the way for hostile takeovers to 
emerge in a large scale. 
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However, in hostile takeover domain, China is grossly not ready in 
terms of dispute resolution and law enforcement. The legal framework 
of Chinese takeover Regulation is a mixture of practices transplanted 
from overseas, notably U.S, U.K and E.U. The U.S approach highlights 
a modified business judgment rule to review directors'fiduciary duty in 
takeovers by the court. The U.K approach empowered a self-regulatory 
entity -the "City Committee" to resolve takeover disputes and the court 
is kept out of the process. Drawing experiences from the U.K, the E.U 
approach centers the Board Neutrality Rule, which deprives 
management of the power to adopt any takeover defenses unless 
authorized by shareholders. 
The Chinese hodgepodge intended to absorb the very essence of al the 
foreign experiences. In China law, the Administrative Rules on 
Acquisition has substantive rules on directors'fiduciary duty, and the 
board neutrality rule can be found both in Company Law and Securities 
Law. Besides, CSRC established the Audit Committee of Mergers and 
Acquisitions based on the℃ ity Committee" of U.K. 
During the last two decades, this Chinese "a-little-bit-of-everything" 
regime failed to provide enough and clear guidance to participants in 
takeovers, and caused uncertainty and anxiety in the Chinese market. 
Under the supply-side reform to vitalize enterprises, the whole Chinese 
industries are in desperate need of takeovers to better utilize social 
resources. Hence, an underperformed takeover law system can damage 
the well-being of the society as a whole. 
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Some scholars attribute the failure of law transplantation in China to 
(5) 
"local factors" or "cultural antipathy", but the real reason was China 
transplanted laws from abroad without understanding their intrinsic 
qualities. Thus, poor adoption of foreign laws leads to poor local 
regulatory effects. Then, what is the internal logic of the foreign law? 
How should China improve its takeover regulation? Which model is the 
fit one for China? What kind of rules should be reserved and what kind 
of rules should be abandoned? 
This paper aims to answer those questions with an in-depth review the 
Chinese takeover legal framework, and to give suggestions for the 
power allocation in takeover regulations in China by revealing the true 
merits of takeover regulations in U.S and E.U. Part I, I, II 
demonstrates the takeover regulatory framework in U.S, E.U and China 
respectively. Part IV examines the Chinese regime empirically by 
digging into the ex-ante and ex-post defensive measure in hostile 
takeovers. Part V analyses the crucial elements in Chinese takeover law 
and Part VI offers suggestions for the improvements. 
The fiduciary-duty-centered U.S approach is the very opposite of the 
Board-Neutrality-Rule-centered E.U approach. In order to sustain 
growth, the E.U model which facilitates takeovers is more optimal for 
China. In line with this, CSRC's substantive intervention seems to be a 
better substitute for the implementation of a court-review fiduciary 
duty system in China and the already existed Mandatory Bid Rule 
should be modified accordingly. Meanwhile, the Board Neutrality Rule 
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should be suspended when facing extremely high-ratio leverage buyouts. 
In sum, this paper argues that the Chinese takeover regime should 
favor the primacy of the shareholders over the will of board of 
directors; but the different types of shareholders should also be 
identified. In companies with concentrated ownership structure, the 
agency costs between majority and minority shareholders are high, and 
the minority shareholders should be empowered with more 
preponderance in adopting takeover defenses. 
I . Legal Framework of U .STakeover Regulation 
I begin with the two most prominent takeover legal regime -the U.S 
and E.U approach. 
The legal framework of American takeover regulation has attracted 
enormous attention academically, and in this part I focus on three 
resources of American takeover law -Federal Status, judicial decisions 
from the Delaware Court of Chancery and State Statutes. 
A. Federal Status: The Williams Act of 1968 
Takeover activities were incorporated into federal regulation since 1968, 
when congress of U.S passed the Williams Act. The Williams Act was 
an amendment of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 that 
regulated tender offers and other takeover related actions, but most 
important of al, the fundamental goal of this Act was to ensure 
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enough information disclosure to shareholders, so that they could make 
(6) 
informed decisions that are best of their interest. At that time, abuses 
with cash tender offers was everywhere in the U.S, and the Act aimed 
to require full and fair disclosure for the benefit of stockholders, 
meanwhile providing the acquirer and management equal chance to 
(7) 
fairly present their cases. 
Therefore, two core aspects of Williams Act are: first, the mandatory 
information disclosure requirements; second, legal procedure for tender 
bids. 
Section 13 (d), (e), (f), (g) mainly deals with acquirer's duty of 
(8) 
information disclosure. Any person, or group who acquires beneficial 
ownership of 5 percent or more of a class of equity securities must file 
with the SEC within ten days. Certain information disclosure includes: 
acquirer's identity and background, resource of the acquisition fund, 
purpose of this acquisition (including plans to liquidate the target 
company or adjust major business of the company), and to what extent 
the acquirer wants to obtain control. 
(9) 
Section 14 (d), (e), (f) stipulates certain rules for acquisition behav10r, 
for instance, shareholders have the right to withdrew their acceptance 
of the offer within 7 days from the first day of the offer. Tender offer 
must last for at least 20 days, and when there are more shares for sale 
than anticipated, the offeror has to acquire those shares on an equal 
proportion basis. 
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In sum, the Williams Act serves as the base line of tender offer activity 
which requires acquirer conform to the minimum requirement of 
information disclosure and equal price payment. The Securities and 
Exchange Commission (hereinafter SEC) is the federal governor of 
securities activities in the U.S, and SEC monitors the U.S securities 
market under the guidance of Williams Act. Meanwhile, SEC also has 
other laws that governs false statement, fraud and misleading behavior, 
but the most important element in American hostile takeover regulation 
-the fiduciary duty of directors, is oversaw by the court. 
B. Judicial decisions from Delaware Court: Unocal, Revlon and 
Sotheby Rule 
Federal regulation makes up only a small fraction of American 
takeover regulation. Judicial decisions of directors'fiduciary duty, is 
the core of American regulation. Although every state of American has 
its own law, most large companies of American were registered in 
Delaware, whose corporate law is the most advanced one and whose 
(10) 
Chancery Court represents the highest efficiency in U.S. 
The far-reaching case of Unocal Corp V. Mesa Petroleum Co. case in 
1985 established the interim standard to review directors'action in 
response to a hostile takeover. In this case, the corporate raider, Mesa 
Petroleum, who was nationally famous for greenmail, held 13% of 
Unocal's Share. It then launched a two-tier tender offer for Unocal's 
37% outstanding shares: the front side of this tender is 54 dollars per 
share paid by cash, and the end side is 54 dollars per share paid by 
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junk bond. Considering the offer price being too low and the chance of 
greenmail being too high, the Unocal board intended to launch a 
selective self-tender offer plan, in which if Mesa had obtained 64 million 
shares of Unocal, the Unocal board would purchase shares from 
stockholders other than Mesa at 72 dollars per share. Hence, the plan 
once triggered, would enable Unocal repurchase 49% outstanding shares 
except those hold by Mesa. The Supreme Court of Delaware ruled the 
(11) 
validity of this self-tender. 
In this case, the Supreme court realized the directors were of necessity 
confronted with a conflict of interest, for they might very possibly be 
superseded if the acquisition succeeded. Because of the conflict of 
interest, the traditional Business Judgement Rule was not enough to 
prevent them from injuring shareholder benefits. Therefore, the Court 
established a two-part reasonableness-based tests, to determine whether 
directors of the board were legitimated to take defensive measures. 
Under this test, the defendant -directors of the board, was required to 
prove that: first, they had reasonable ground to believe that a danger 
to corporate policy and effectiveness existed because of another person's 
stock ownership, and; second, the defensive measures which they were 
taking were reasonable in relation to the threat posed. 
What also worth noting is that the Supreme Court did not require the 
board to get approval of the def ens es from shareholders, and did not 
restrict directors'concern of the acquirer and the company to 
shareholders'benefits alone, which empowered the directors to have 
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even larger discretion when facing hostile takeover. Concerns of 
directors could include: price and timing of the offer, illegality of the 
acquisition, impact on related party such as employee, creditors and 
even customers. 
The two-part reasonableness-based test established in the Unocal case is 
a modified version of the Business Judgement Rule, and it is the 
defendant, not the plaintiff, bears the burden of proof. This is because 
the conflict of interest is almost inevitable in the use of takeover 
defenses. 
In the same year of 1985, based on the foundation of the Unocal 
rulings, the Delaware court upheld a poison pil (an aggressive 
shareholder rights plan) as a legitimate exercise of business judgment 
by Household International's board of directors in Moran v. Household 
International, Inc. This case is the first one in which a U.S state court 
(12) 
upheld a poison pil as a legitimate reaction to hostile takeover. 
In 1986, a landmark decision of the Delaware Supreme Court on hostile 
takeovers was ruled in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 
Inc. The Supreme Court restricted freedom of the board in taking 
defensive measures. The acquirer -Pantry Pride of MacAndrews & 
Forbes Holdings, Inc., offered a price of 40-42 dollars per share for 
Revlon's outstanding shares. The management thought the price was 
simple not sufficient and therefore launched a series of takeover 
defenses. The share repurchases by the target company didn't scare 
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away the company raider, rather, Pantry Pride became quite 
determined and raised the price of his offer from 47.5 dollars per share 
al the way to 56.25 dollars per share. When recognizing Revlon was 
inevitable for sale, the Revlon board stil brought their white knight -
Forstmann into the game, with whom the management provided a 
series privileged terms such as a waiver of the restrictive covenants as 
well as a huge amount of cancellation fe. The acquirer then resorted to 
(13) 
the court for an injunction on Revlon's plan. 
The court opined that, the initial takeover defenses by Revlon board 
was reasonable and proportionate, which fitted the best interest of 
shareholders. However, the situation had dramatically changed, when 
the sale of the company became inevitable. Under this circumstance, it 
was the duty of the board to search for the highest bidder, rather than 
to retain control of the company. Hence, it is improper for the board to 
offer favorable terms to a non-shareholder third party in order create 
difficulties for the less-favored acquirer. Directors of the board breached 
their duty of care by creating unnecessary obstacle that might well 
(14) 
impede the auction. 
The Revlon case reveals that, when sale of a company become inevitable 
or has already begun, the duty of the board switches from protecting 
the company into obtaining the highest price for the benefit of the 
shareholders. In short, the board role becomes an "auctioneer" -
responsible for transferring the company to the highest bidder, with no 
intention to frustrate it. 
124 
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In two subsequent Case: Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc. 
and Paramount Communications Inc. V. QVC Network Inc., has 
provided certain guidance on directors'duty under Revlon situation and 
non-Revlon situation. The court had strengthened its judicial review on 
management's behavior. And Revlon's duty is triggered "when a 
corporation initiates and active bidding process seeking to sel itself or 
to effect a business reorganization involving a clear break-up of the 
(15) 
company", and "where, in response to a bidder's offer, a target 
abandons its long-term strategy and seeks an alternative transaction 
(16) 
also involving the breakup of the company". 
In 1995, in the case of Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., the 
Delaware Court had further interpreted board of directors'ability to 
use defensive measures, such as poison pils or buybacks, in reaction to 
hostile takeover. This case demonstrates an approach to corporate 
governance that favors the primacy of the board of directors over the 
will of the shareholders. According to the court ruling, once 
independent directors has ratified the use of takeover defenses, they are 
allowed as long as those measures are not "draconian" and within the 
(17) 
reasonable boundary of the imminent threat. 
In 2014, in the widely-controversial case of Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht 
(often referred to as the Sotheby case), the Delaware Court of Chancery 
further endorsed the primacy of the board of directors over the will of 
the shareholders. 
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"…Third Point had claimed that Sotheby's directors had violated 
their fiduciary duties in order to obtain an impermissible advantage 
in a proxy contest with Third Point by (i) adopting a poison pill in 
anticipation of the proxy contest and (i) refusing to provide a 
waiver to Third Point from certain of such poison pill's terms…The 
Court held that Third Point was not reasonably likely to succeed on 
the merits on such claims based on its findings that the Sotheby's 
board of directors had identified legitimate and legally cognizable 
threats to the company's corporate policy and effectiveness and that 
the board's actions were proportionate responses to the threats posed 
and were not preclusive of a proxy contest… 
…[Therefore], the Delaware Court of Chancery denied the motion of 
Third Point LLC and its co-plaintiffs for a preliminary injunction 
(18) 
to enjoin Sotheby's from holding its annual meeting・・・ 
Court's predilection for directors of the board is quite obvious in 
American legal system, but the reason is deeply hidden in the judge-
made law system. For a long time, compare with legislation and self-
regulatory mechanism, litigation is considered to be less influenced by 
interest groups, this especially submitted in common law jurisdictions -
those who participated in litigations have to agree on previous rulings, 
and it's almost impossible for any participant to step-by-step affect the 
climate of the law, which is simply way too time consuming and 
expensive. However, in U.S corporate governance regime, judicial 
precedent may, litle by litle, time by time, move towards into a status 
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where directors are given more primacy. The defendant in the takeover 
suits are usually the directors, when D&O insurance and golden 
parachutes counteract the financial risks, they however face their loss 
in reputations, especially when defeated in court. Meanwhile, as they 
have the resources their company has to offer, they intend to pacify 
conflicts using money. But they cannot prevent the acquisition party 
from applying injunctions from the court, therefore, most takeover 
disputes come from injunctions applied by acquirers. Goal of the 
acquirers is to obtain control of the company, but litigation can at 
most disarm management from takeover defenses, which benefits al 
potential acquirers as a whole. This free-riding problem usually prevent 
acquirers from litigations, and those conflicts usually get pacified one 
(19) 
way or another. In another words, the directors of the board, as 
repeated players in those game, naturally have better information and 
resources to win in litigations. 
Judges are faced with cases that are brought to them, and legal 
precedents are accumulated on judge-made law. As a consequence, in 
American corporate law regime represented by Delaware, the board has 
the primacy and ascendency, not the shareholders or acquirers. 
C. State Statutes 
Except the federal law enforced by SEC and fiduciary duty ruled by the 
court, another important source of American Law is the State Anti-
Takeover Law. Those law are regarded as less impartial, as most of 
them favor the corporations incorporated in their states, protecting 
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target companies thoroughly from acquisitions outside the state. Those 
laws have gone through three generations of development, and are very 
(20) 
common in most of the states. 
The first generation of State Statutes is aiming at regulating offer 
bids, by empowering the state regulator the authority to review the 
merits of the offer and sufficiency of information disclosure; or in its 
direct goal, protect specific local industry. For instance, when Belzbergy 
Family, who was notorious for greenmail, threatened to takeover Arvin 
Industries in Columbus Indiana, the state regulator imposed a long 
waiting period to review the merits of the offer in favor of Arvin 
Industries. Arvin hired 2000 local employees and gave support to local 
education. 
However, powerful and compelling as they were, some State Statutes 
were nullified by the Supreme Court. For example, in 1982, the waiting 
period imposed by Illinois statue was considered to have breached the 
Interstate Commerce Clause in American Constitution in Edgar v. Mite 
Corp case. The Supreme Court held that local state should not turn a 
deaf ear to non-local shareholders'interests when protecting local 
(21) 
investors'rights. 
The second generation of anti-takeover law focus on the protection of 
information disclosure, among which the most famous and most 
efficient one was called℃ ontrol Share Acquisition Statute". Under this 
law, a bid acquring the target company has to be approved by the 
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majority of disinterested shares. In 1987, the Supreme Court upheld 
Indiana's℃ ontrol Share Acquisition Statute" in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics 
Corp. of America. According to the Indiana statute, outstanding shares 
where the part exceeds 20% carries no voting right, unless this 
independent shareholder obtained voting right for this part of his 
(22) 
shares in general meetings of shareholders. "Fair Price Statute" is also 
quite common in State Statutes, which requires acquisition to be 
approved by supermajority of shareholders unless they al get the 
equivalent best price of the acquirer. Another kind of State Statute is 
the "Stakeholder Statute", which permits management consider the 
(23) 
interest of al stakeholders rather than stockholders alone. 
The third generation went even further in protecting target companies. 
"Freeze Statute" of New York prohibits a merger within 5 years of an 
acquisition that gives control to an offeror unless that transaction was 
approved by the target company's directors before the acquisition itself. 
And "Disgorgement Statute" of Pennsylvania requires any person 
owning more than twenty percent of a corporation's shares to disgorge 
any profit realized within an eighteen month's period. Most third 
generation State Statutes survive the Constitutional Challenge of the 
(24) 
Federal Courts. 
In conclusion, the American corporate law represented by Delaware, the 
directors of the board have the primary power of major corporate 
issues -including the use of defensive measures. In contrast, 
shareholders are passive and inactive. Mergers, acquisitions, sale of 
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corporate assets and even modification of company's article normally 
does not require shareholders'approval. Except those powers clearly 
specified in state laws and in the certificate of incorporation that 
belong to shareholders, al other powers are executed by directors of 
the board, which gives directors of the board more primacy and 
primary decision-making authority. 
I. Legal Framework of European Takeover Regulation 
European Countries has their own takeover laws, which is famous for 
its comprehensiveness. The European Directive on Takeover Bids is now 
the centerpiece of European takeover regulation, it provides provisions 
and regulations on takeover bids in al member states of the European 
Union. 
The notion of "a united European takeover law" came from the research 
by Committee of the European Union on unifying European's internal 
market. In 1985, in a landmark document Completing the internal 
market: white paper from the commission to the European Council, 
Committee of the European Union mentioned its will to improve the 
procedure of offers of shares to the public. Then, in 1989, Committee of 
the European Union drafted the Proposal for a Thirteenth Council 
Directive on Company Law Concerning Takeover and Other General Bids 
based on the foundation of British City Code on Takeovers and Mergers. 
This proposal contained basic equal treatment rule for shareholders and 
depicted the rudiment of the general duty of the acquirer and 
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management of target company. The acquirer was requested to provide 
sufficient information, and once exceeds certain percentage of shares the 
acquirer has to mandatorily obtain al outstanding shares through offer 
biは．
This proposal didn't work out under drastic critics from U.K and 
Germany. Although based on British City Code, the U.K Department of 
Trade and Industry feared that codifying the non-statutory self-
regulation code might impair Takeover Panel's speed and flexibility. 
And European's industry feared that such a united law might pave the 
way for trivial suits al over Europe. 
A new takeover directive proposal was handed in by the Committee in 
1996 after negotiating consequently with member states. This new 
proposal was based on the previous one, but cancelled the mandatory 
application of certain rules and regulations and member states can 
thereby choose rules and regulations from the Directive so far as rela-
tive and reasonable protections for minority shareholders were in 
(26) 
place. To address the U.K.'s fear of losing discretionary power, Article 
4(6) clarified the supervisory authority in each member state: "This 
Directive does not affect the powers of the Member States to designate 
judicial or other authorities responsible for dealing with disputes and 
for deciding on irregularities committed in the bid procedure nor does it 
affect the power of Member States to regulate whether and under which 
circumstances parties to a bid are entitled to bring administrative or 
judicial proceedings. In particular, this Directive does not affect the 
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power which courts may have in a Member State to decline to hear legal 
proceedings and to decide whether or not such proceedings affect the 
outcome of a bid. This Directive shall not affect the powers of the 
Member States to determine the legal position concerning the liability of 
supervisory authorities or concerning litigation between the parties to a 
bi屈
This new proposal again failed unify the interest of al member states. 
The Takeover Panel in U.K fear that it may open the Pandora's box for 
expensive litigations; Netherland expressed their concerns over the 
absolute ban on takeover defenses by directors of the board without 
shareholders'approval. 
After a series of failure in the beginning of 2000s, the Committee asked 
the leading scholar in European corporate governance -Jaap Winter to 
establish a team unit to propose and draft another unified Takeover 
Directive. Winter's mission was to bring up a proposal, to strengthen 
and unify European Industry, and to improve the efficiency of a single 
market in Europe. This time, "a level playing field" was the core, and 
Winter's team invented the "Breakthrough Rule" and other institutional 
(28) 
creation to ensure shareholders being treat equally. 
Winter's new proposal, like al previous ones, faced severe attacks. 
Sweden was particularly unhappy for the "Breakthrough Rule" nullified 
more than half of its listed companies'dual equity structure. Germany 
also harshly objected the "Breakthrough Rule" as lots of share transfer 
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(29) 
limitation existed in German listed compames. 
After ・r contmuous negotla 10ns and compromises, the Italian 
Representative worked out the idea that allow corporations to freely 
choose laws to adopt under the board neutrality role. This compromise 
proposal solved the long time haggle between member states and 
thereby acquired wide-range acknowledgement. In 2004, The European 
Directive on Takeover Bids was finally passed after revising the 
compromise proposal for several times. 
The 2004 European Directive on Takeover Bids intended to harmonize 
the takeover regulation of al 27 member states. The deadline for each 
member state to deploy the Directive was the end of 2006, and almost 
al countries had finished this mission by then. 
A. General Clauses 
Like the clauses in Chinese Securities Law and American SEC's regula-
tion, Article 8 of the Directive deals with information disclosure of the 
offer and acquirer: "Member States shall ensure that a bid is made 
public in such a way as to ensure market transparency and integrity for 
the securities of the off eree company, of the off eror or of any other 
company affected by the bid, ・in particular in order to prevent the 
(30) 
publication or dissemination of false or misleading information". 
The European Directive has extremely thorough requirement for 
(31) 
information disclosure of the acquirer, which could be used as the 
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paradigmatic pattern for other countries in information disclosure. It 
not only concerns about specific information a company has to offer, 
but also the way in which it should be offered. 
Those General Clause are not the essential part of European Takeover 
Law, the following part I will focus on three most important 
paradigms of European Directive on Takeover Bids -the Mandatory Bid 
Rule, the Board Neutrality Rule and Breakthrough Rule, which 
illustrate this "compromised" Directive has its own unique strengths. 
B. Mandatory Bid Rule 
The Mandatory Bid Rule is the first pillar of the European Takeover 
Directive, which requires the acquirer to buy al outstanding shares 
through offer bids. This is exactly the opposite of American's free 
acquisition style. Article 5 of the Directive is about protection of 
minority shareholders, the mandatory bid and the equitable price. 
Essential of Article 5 is, any individual who has obtained sufficient 
shares to secure control has to acquire al outstanding shares by offer 
bids at an equitable price. Article 5(3) allows each member state 
according to their needs and situation to set their threshold percentage 
respectively. The so-called equitable price is actually the "highest" 
price an acquirer paid for the same shares within a certain period, a 
period which each member states have discretionary power to set for 
themselves. The supervisory authority in each member state are 
empowered to adjust the "equitable price" according to the declared 
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(32) . 
criteria. 
Some member states have exemptions from the mandatory bid rule, 
among which Ireland and Germany has many situations under which 
the acquirer is exempt from tender offer bids. Anyway, the European 
Directive leaves the member states with considerable room to define 
their own mandatory bids requirement, only when the acquisition has 
reached certain thresholds does the publicly offer bid become 
(33) 
compulsory. 
C. Board Neutrality Rule 
The European Directive requires directors of the board to be subject to 
the Board Neutrality Rule, when facing hostile takeovers. Thus the 
board, generally, should not take any actions as responses to takeovers. 
Article 9 concerns the obligations of the board of the target company. 
According to Article 9, once the board are aware of the offer bids, they 
should not take any actions that may frustrate the acquisition activity 
before obtaining authorization from shareholders, except finding the 
alternative potential offeror to join the bid. Hence, shareholders under 
the Directive are given the primary decision-making power in takeover 
defenses, and for directors of the board, almost any anti-takeover 
actions are violation of Article 9 as they are obstacles for takeovers in 
nature, unless otherwise instructed by shareholders. Article 9 also 
stipulates that when authorized by shareholders to take defensive 
measures, the directors of the boards are no longer subject to the Board 
(34) 
Neutrality Rule. 
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The intriguing part of Article 9 isthe two specifically mentioned take-
over defenses -the former was allowed and the latter was banned. 
Article 9 permits the board to find "white knight", even without 
shareholders'approval, and it explicitly forbids issuing any shares that 
(35) 
may impede the acquirer obtaining control. Hence poison pills are not 
allowed under the European Directive, and neither, issuing new shares 
can hardly be a useful defensive measure. 
D. Breakthrough Rule 
The Board Neutrality Rule has frozen the board from taking actions, 
but it pales in comparison to the Breakthrough Rule, which 
straightway voids al previous arrangements which enable voting 
leverage of the management -be it stated in the Articles of 
Associations or elaborated in shareholding agreements. The 
Breakthrough Rule in Article 11 of the Directive is the most 
controversial one in the Directive, but we have to admit that it 
encourages the prosperity of hostile takeovers. 
The Directive requires "equitable compensation" to those shareholders 
whose voting leverage was nullified by the Breakthrough Rule, but it 
does not clarify how should this compensation be fulfilled. Such 
responsibility falls on the head of each member states and is left 
unsolved even until today. Article 11 also stipulates that, once the 
acquisition is open to public, within the duration of validity of the 
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tender offer, any limitations and restrictions on share transfer do not 
apply between the acquirer and acquiree -those share transfer 
restrictions are frequently seen in German listed companies. Moreover, 
any restrictions on voting power in general meetings of shareholders 
are not applicable as well. Finally, when acquirer obtain more than 75% 
voting capital, any extraordinary rights which limit share transfer or 
voting power and any special rights to appoint or remove directors of 
the board are void, and holders of multiple votes securities only have 
(36) 
one vote per share in the first general meeting held by the acquirer. 
All in al, the Breakthrough Rule makes the control shareholder and 
incumbent directors of the board impossible to have disproportionate 
control power over the company. They are no longer shielded by voting 
leverages and restriction on share transfer, rather, they have to 
compete with the acquirer for further corporate control. This kind of 
rules are seldom seen in other countries or regions, but they do largely 
decrease the agency cost between minority shareholder and the 
controlling shareholders. 
E. Opt-outs and Exemptions 
The most creative clause in the European Directive, is the optional 
arrangements of voluntary application of the Board Neutrality Rule 
and the Breakthrough Rule, as stipulated in Article 12:'[m]ember 
States may reserve the right not to require companies as referred to in 
Article 1(1) which have their registered offices within their territories to 
(31) 
apply Article 9(2) and (3) and/or Article 1. ".
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The existence of Article 12 ensures that the takeover regulations in 
Europe today are diverse and manifold. Despite the same foundation, 
every member state has large discretionary power in adopting core 
rules that are suitable for them. Meanwhile, the discretionary power is 
ultimately left to shareholders as they have the final say on whether to 
write certain rules into their Articles of Association in their general 
meetings. Also, when faced with acquirers who doesn't apply those 
rules, companies choose to adopt them can temporarily discontinue its 
application of those rules. In sum, Article 12 makes the European 
Directive more flexible than ever. 
il. Legal Framework of Chinese Takeover Regulation 
A. Regulator 
The China Security Regulatory Commission (hereinafter CSRC) is the 
main regulator in Chinese Securities Market, who has the ultimate and 
exclusive right over takeover disputes as a technocrat, just like the SEC 
in the United States. In 2006, CSRC established a special unit to address 
takeover relative affairs -the Audit Committee of Mergers and 
Acquisitions (hereinafter ACMA), which consists of related experts and 
professionals on a part-time basis. Opinions on takeover issues from 
ACMA represents the state-of-art conclusive view of CSRC. In recent 
years, the CSRC has lowered its administrative intervention in Mergers 
and Acquisitions, partly by eliminating administrative approval 
requirement and entitling oversight power to stock exchange and CSRC 
(38) 
dispatched offices. 
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One thing worth noting is that public censure from CSRC sometimes 
has the same prohibitive effect to certain behaviors in takeovers, just 
like substantive laws do. For instance, "Bao Wan dispute" is a 
significant event in the capital market of China in 2016. With the help 
of insurance funds, a relatively small company -Baoneng in 2016 
managed to knocked on the door of Wanke -a Chinese real estate 
giant, and simultaneously the door of Geli -a Chinese air conditioner 
manufacturer giant. Since then, universal insurance as the 
representative of the insurance funds frequently appeared in the capital 
(39) 
market and placards. On December 3'd, 2016, chairman of CSRC, Mr. 
LIU Shiyu condemned "barbaric" leveraged company buy-outs by some 
asset managers using illegal funds. Liu said China's capital markets had 
seen a series of "abnormal phenomena" lately, challenging the bottom 
(40) 
line of China's financial law and regulations. "You launch leveraged 
buy-outs using illegitimate money, turning from a stranger to a 
barbarian at the gate, and ultimately becoming a robber in the 
industry. That is unacceptable." Two days after LIU's speech, On 
December 5th, 2016, China stocks slumped on Monday morning, with the 
(41) 
blue-chip index set for its biggest fal in six months. LIU's warning 
against "barbaric" share acquisitions alone restraint the wild growth of 
leverage buy-out in China, at least for now. Meanwhile, the sale of 
universal insurance is called off by China Insurance Regulatory 
Commissi孟
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B. Law and Provisions 
In China, the regulatory provisions governing takeover defenses today 
can be found in several laws as well as administrative rules 
promulgated by the CSRC, including People's Republic of China's 
Company Law (hereinafter 2014 Company Law as it came into effect on 
(43) 
1st March 2014), People's Republic of China's Securities Law (hereinafter 
(44) 
2014 Securities Law as its last amendment is in 2014), Administrative 
Rules on Acquisition of Listed Company (hereinafter 2014 
Administrative Rules on Acquisition as its last amendment is in 20『贔
And, although not functioning as a substantive rule, Guidelines on 
Articles of Association of the Companies Listed in China (hereinafter 
2016 Guidelines on Articles of Association as its last amendment is in 
尋 providesuseful guidelines on corporate charters of Chinese listed 
compames. 
1. 2014 Company Law 
Company Law is essential in takeover regulation, because it allocates 
the primary power between shareholders and directors of the board. 
The transfer of corporate control is a major event in nature and 
therefore it's important to clarify who has the ultimate power to adopt 
takeover defenses. 
The Chinese Company Law is clearly shareholder centered as 
shareholders have the ultimate power over major corporate issues such 
as'. …(2) Electing and changing the directors and supervisors assumed by 
non-representatives of the employees and deciding the matters relating 
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to their salaries and compensations; (3) Deliberating and approving 
reports of the board of directors; …(6) Deliberating and approving 
company profit distribution plans and loss recovery plans; (7) Making 
resolutions about the increase or reduction of the company's registered 
capital; (8) Making resolutions about the issuance of corporate bonds;(9) 
Adopting resolutions about the assignment, split-up, change of company 
form, dissolution, liquidation of the company;(lO) Revising the bylaw of 
(47) 
the company". 
By contrast, directors of the board seem to have much less power over 
corporate major issues. The basic role of directors of the board is'. …(2) 
(48) 
Implementing the resolutions made at the shareholders'meetings". They 
are also in charge of working out company's plan on the increase or 
reduction of registered capital, issuance of corporate bonds, as well as 
plans on mergers and change of company forms, and etc. But, 
according to Chinese Company Law, al those plans have to be approved 
by the shareholders before they come into position. 
As most takeover defenses primarily concern with the major issues of 
the company, in theory, the ultimate and last decision power of 
takeover defenses lies in the hands of shareholders rather than directors 
of the board. Shareholder approval as the final check of takeover 
defenses largely limited directors'discretion in adopting defensive 
measures. 
Except the rules concerning power distribution among major corporate 
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issues, 2014 Chinese Company Law also has several mandatory rules 
that prohibit certain types of takeover defenses. Article 104 stipulates 
that'Tw]hen a shareholder attends a meeting of the shareholders' 
assembly, he shall have one voting right for each share he holds. 
(49) 
However, the company has no voting right for its own shares it holds. " 
This "one-share-one-vote" rule directly voids any shareholding 
arrangements aim to benefit from vote leverage mechanisms. Insurance 
of different classes of shares with different voting power is strictly 
prohibited by this rule and therefore the dual-class equity structures, 
which are quite common in Anglo-American and European countries, 
are hard to find in Chinese Listed Companies. Some companies in China 
circumvent this rule by stock pyramiding, and circular shareholding. 
Article 127 requires that "[t)he issuance of shares shall comply with the 
principle off airness and impartiality. The shares of the same class shall 
have the same rights and benefits", meanwhile, "[t]he stocks issued at 
the same time shall be equal in price and shall be subject to the same 
conditions. The price of each share purchased by any organization or 
(50) 
individual shall be the same." As al shares of the same class shall 
carry the same rights and benefits, al stocks issued at the same time 
shall worth same money and are subject to same conditions, insurance 
of securities that has discriminative effect is illegal according to Chinese 
Company Law. Therefore, Chinese management cannot adopt poison 
pills when facing hostile acquisitions. 
Repurchase of company shares as a basic defensive measure is pervasive 
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not only in the U.S or U.K, but also even in Asian countries like Japan 
or Korea. However, Article 144 in 2014 Company Law disqualifies 
repurchase of company shares as a defensive measure. In China, a 
company can purchase its own shares only in the following 
circumstances: "…(1) To decrease the registered capital of the company; 
(2) To merge another company holding shares of this company; (3) To 
award the employees of this company with shares; or (4) It is requested 
by any shareholder to purchase his shares because this shareholder 
objects to the company's resolution on merger or split-up made by the 
(51) 
assembly of shareholders." Meanwhile, the repurchased share should be 
either written off within ten days of the purchase or transferred to 
employees with n one year. 
2. 2014 Securities Law 
Securities Law is M&A immediately related, and is the most important 
law governing acquisition behaviors. 
In order to prevent short-term share price sparks benefits, Article 47 
serves as a "Disgorgement Statute" in Chinses Securities Law. Article 47 
stipulates that'[w]here a director, supervisor or senior manager of a 
listed company, or a shareholder who holds 5% or more of the shares of 
a listed company sells the shares of the company within six months of 
purchasing such shares, or repurchases the shares within six months of 
selling such shares, the gains therefrom, if any, shall belong to the 
company, a~d the board of directors of the company shall recover such 
(52) 
gains." This article effectively constrains the impulse of corporate 
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raiders to get disproportionate revenues from cashing out at a "good" 
timing or dismantling the company for sale. Several of Securities Law's 
provisions regulate the target company management and hostile 
acquirer's behavior in takeovers. For instance, Chinse Securities Law 
has intact information disclosure requirement. 
The mandatory report and announcement requirement is of great 
importance in Securities Law. Article 86 requires that'Tw]hen, through 
securities trading on a stock exchange, the shareholding of an investor, 
or the deemed joint-shareholding of an investor and others in virtue of 
agreements or other arrangements, has reached 5% of the issued shares 
of a listed company, the investor shall, within three days from the date 
on which such shareholding becomes a fact, report in writing to the 
securities regulatory authority under the State Council and the stock 
(53) 
exchange", during this period,'Tt]he investor shall not continue to 
(54) 
purchase or sel the share of the said listed company". If the investor 
wants to further acquire shares of the company, "every 5% increase or 
decrease in such shareholdings thereafter shall be reported and 
(55) 
announced". 
On July 27th, 2015, the "Hu brothers" was sued at Intermediate People's 
Court of Lhasa for their malfunction on July 15th, 2015, when they 
acquire 6.4% of an A-share listed company called Tibet Tourism Co., 
Ltd, they didn't report to securities regulatory authority and the stock 
exchange. The "Hu brothers" was then subject to an administrative 
penalty of around 100,000 RMB. This trivial event had triggered the 
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discussion domestically about the validity of Hu brothers'voting right 
after violation of the securities law. Until now there is no conclusion of 
whether the shares obtained secretly should carry the voting power or 
not, and the 100,000 RMB's fine seems to be too litle cost compare to 
the huge benefit of acquiring shares in a way that was undetectable by 
target companies. Meanwhile, it is stil not clear that when hostile 
acquirers violate this rule, should the target company resort to the 
court for help, or make complaints directly to CSRC. 
Besides information disclosure requirements, Article 7, Article 78 and 
Article 79 govern false statement, fraud and misleading behavior -
which is known as the three original sin in Chinese securities market. 
Issuance of new shares is another huge thing in Chinese Securities 
domain. Article 13 requires the company who makes public issuance of 
new shares meet certain conditions: "(l) having a sound and well-
functioning organizational structure; (2) having sustainable profitability 
and being financially sound; (3) having had no false entries in its 
financial and accounting documents for three years immediately 
preceding the application, and no other major illegal activities 
attributable to it; and (4) such other conditions as may be so prescribed 
by the securities regulatory authority under the State Council and so 
(56) 
approved by the State Council . 
This rule on share insurance makes it almost impossible for 
management to frustrate a hostile takeover by issuing new shares. The 
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target company has to satisfy certain conditions in order to issue new 
shares, most of which are hard to meet when share prices are at a low 
ebb -exactly the time corporate raiders attack. Moreover, in China, 
even if insurance of new shares does not have so many merits-review 
requirement, it stil cannot be used as a takeover defense, because it 
usually takes too long to obtain approval from the issuance 
examination commission. According to Article 2, "The securities 
regulatory authority under the State Council shall establish an issuance 
examination commission which shall, pursuant to law, examine the 
(57) 
applications for share issuance." 
Another very important element of the Securities Law, is its provision 
of the mandatory bid rule. Article 88 requires an investor launch a 
tender offer to purchase shares when reaching 30% of the issued shares 
(58) 
of a listed company. 
This Chinese mandatory bid rule is different from other countries 
because it's not entirely "mandatory". Because of ownership 
concentration in Chinese Listed Companies, normally the acquirer 
purchase shares from the dominant shareholder by negotiation; this is 
also a reason why hostile takeover is not frequently seen in China. This 
rule only ensures that when reaching 30% shareholding of a listed 
company, continuing acquiring shares by the acquirer can only achieved 
by launching tender offer to al shareholders. Meanwhile, Article 62 of 
the 2014 Administrative Rules on Acquisition has provide three certain 
conditions under which the acquirer is exempt from the mandatory bid 
(59) 
rule, which caused the "tender offer exemption" become a very common 
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in Chinses securities market. 
Til now, the most important elements that are stil missing m 
Securities Law, are rules to clarify what kind of defense measure is 
available and to what extent can they be adopted. The whole Chapter 
four of 2014 Securities Law is about Acquisition of listed companies in 
China, but not one single rule addresses takeover defense issue directly. 
Then, in Article 101 the law maker supplements that "[t]he securities 
regulatory authority under the State Council shall formulate specific 
measures for acquisition of listed companies in accordance with the 
(60) 
principles of this Law…" And in accordance with this article came the 
Administrative Rules on Acquisition, first edition of which was 
promulgated by CSRC in 2002. 
3. 2014 Administrative Rules on Acquisition 
The 2014 Administrative Rules on Acquisition is now the core of 
Chinese anti-takeover regulation. The first version of Administrative 
Rules on Acquisition was promulgated by CSRC in 2002, and was the 
first regulation with direct and clear rules on takeover defenses. 
a. Fiduciary Duty in Chinese Law 
Article 8 is a general rule on directors'duty when employing anti-
takeover activities: "[t]he directors, supervisors and senior managers of 
a target company shall assume the duty of loyalty and duty of care, 
and shall equally treat al the purchasers that intend to take over the 
(61) 
above company." 
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In terms of Chinese fiduciary duty, article 8 used the term of "the duty 
of loyalty and duty of care". Indeed, the same terminology can be well 
found in Chinese Company Law, in Article 148: "[t]he directors, 
supervisors and senior managers shall comply with the laws, 
administrative regulations, and bylaw. They shall bear the duty of 
(62) 
loyalty and duty of care…" This duty of loyalty and duty of care is 
sometimes interpreted as obligation of fidelity and obligation of 
diligence, but they function equivalently to fiduciary duty in Anglo-
American legal regime. The Company Law uses a series of prohibitive 
stipulations to define what "duty of loyalty" is. For example, "[n]o 
director, supervisor or senior manager may accept any bribe or other 
illegal gains by taking the advantage of his powers, or encroach on the 
(63) II 
property of the company and "[n]o director or senior manager may 
commit any of the following acts: (1) Misappropriating the company's 
fund…(6) Taking commissions on the transactions between others and 
the company into his own pocket; (7) Illegally disclosing the company's 
(64) II 
confidential information… and so on. 
The Company Law does not elaborately define the "duty of care", it 
only reveals the consequence directors, supervisors or senior managers 
have to afford when they failing to obey so in Article 150:'T w]here any 
director, supervisor or senior manager violates any law, administrative 
regulation, or the bylaw during the course of performing his duties, if 
(65) 
any loss is caused to the company, he shall be liable for compensation. " 
When Company Law is somehow ambiguous about what "duty of care" 
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should be, the Guidelines on Articles of Association has reiterate it 
clearly in its recommended templates of corporate charter for listed 
companies. For example,'Tm]anagement should exercise their powers 
prudently, conscientiously, and diligently, and ensure al commercial 
activities of the company conforms with the law, administrative rule 
and national economic policy, and commercial activities of the company 
(66) II 
should not exceed its scope of business , and'Tm]anagement should 
provide the board of supervisors with information and materials in 
(61) II 
need, should not hinder them performing their duty. At the same time, 
the Guidelines on Articles of Association has made it clearly that 
companies can add according to the de facto situation as well as their 
(68) 
needs the requirement of duty of care in their company constitut10ns. 
b. Board Neutrality Rule in Chinese Law 
Article 33 of 2014 Administrative Rules on Acquisition provides some 
guidance for Board Neutrality Rule: "During the period after the 
announcement of a takeover bid and before the completion of the 
takeover bid, except for continuing ordinary business and executing 
resolutions made by the general meeting of shareholders, target 
company management, without the ratification of the general 
shareholders'meeting, should not cause major impacts on the assets, 
liabilities, entitlements or business performances of the target company 
by disposing of assets, engaging in external investments, adjusting the 
(69) 
main businesses, providing guarantees or loans and others". 
Although it can be interpreted from several perspectives, the basic 
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principle in this article was supposed to be, without shareholder 
approval, directors of the board should not take any action in response 
to an imminent threat. As we will discuss in the next chapters, this 
Chinese Board Neutrality Rule has very big loopholes and does not 
function properly in takeover issues. 
4. 2016 Guidelines on Articles of Association 
Guidelines on Articles of Association is not substantive law in nature, 
it is more like a guidance book on how should listed companies 
construct their constitution to maximum the corporate governance 
efficiency. It works as an exemplary template of corporate charter, and 
so long as it does not violate relevant law and regulations, listed 
companies can add more practical rules according to their needs or 
adjust certain phrases or expressions in the Guide line to meet the 
individual requirements. 
Although no need for ratification to do so, such amendments should be 
specially announced to the public when the board makes announcement 
of revision of the articles of association. Therefore, listed companies are 
able to introduce takeover defenses in their corporate charters as far as 
they don't violate the on-going law and conform with the procedural 
rule of announcement. 
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N. Empirical Research on Chinese Hostile Takeovers: 
Provisions and Cases 
To understand how takeovers are regulated and how powers are 
allocated in takeover laws, this chapter focuses on the takeover defenses 
in hostile takeovers. 
Based on the time when takeover defenses were used, they could be 
(70) 
broadly divided into two types -ex ante defenses and ex post defenses. 
Ex ante defenses are defensive measures that have already in place 
before the takeover bids, normally it appears as anti-takeover articles in 
corporate charter. As the corporate charter has to be approved in the 
general meetings of shareholders, theoretically the shareholders have 
the final say of such provisions. However, due to the inherent agency 
costs exist between the management and shareholders, directors of the 
board usually use their position to affect the corporate charter in favor 
of their interests. 
Ex post defenses are defensive measures taken by management of the 
target company after the emergence of the takeover bid, and it has 
many different types. In sum, while ex ante defenses are proactive and 
• (71) 
precautionary, ex post defenses are usually passive and targeted. 
A. Ex ante defenses in China 
According to an empirical research by Professor Hui HUANG, anti-
東北法学第47号 (2017) 151 
takeover provisions are quite common in Chinese listed companies, 
especially those with a disperse ownership. He conducted a research of 
300 Chinese A-share company, and over half of them adopted such 
provisions. Most of those who didn't adopt these provisions have a 
controlling shareholder who holds more than 30% of the company share. 
There are seven different types of anti-takeover provision in Chinese 
listed companies. 
The first type stipulates that anyone holds more than 5% or 10% share 
of the company has to get approvals from the directors of the board or 
general meetings of shareholders to acquire more shares, otherwise 
those shares acquired carry no director nominating right or voting 
right. 
The second type of anti-takeover provision is to empower the board 
with the authority to review new directors nominated by shareholders. 
This means the board has to right not to bring the proposal for 
approval after they review the nomination. In other words, the ultimate 
nomination power falls in the hand of the board. 
The third type is to raise the substantive standard for shareholders to 
nominate directors of the board. For example, there are provisions that 
require shareholder with over 5% shares to hold those shares for a 
certain period (usually 180 days or half year). Some companies even 
require the election of directors to be approved by a supermajority of 
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75% present shareholders at general meeting. 
The fourth type is to pose qualification requirement for chairman of 
the board or directors of the board. For example, chairman and 
directors should at least have worked in the company for six months 
before they are eligible for nomination. Apparently, this increases the 
difficulty for the hostile corporate raider -usually outsiders of the 
(72) 
company -to set their foot into the board. 
The fifth type is the staggered board provision, which is brought from 
Anglo-Saxon countries. Under this provision, the term of office for 
directors is usually three years, and each general meeting of 
shareholders can only reelect part of -usually one third -incumbent 
directors, which poses uncertainty and delay for the acquirer to take 
real control of the company. The basic theory of staggered board 
provision is to divide the directors of the board into three group, and 
every general meeting can only replace one group, thus the acquirer has 
to wait for at least two rounds to obtain the majority seat in the 
board. 
The six type requires removing directors at their tenure must have 
reasonable cause. Apparently, if incumbent directors are not dismissed, 
the acquirer cannot appoint directors that represent their interests. 
Article 47 in Chinese Company Law prohibits the dismissal of 
management without cause, but this rule was deleted in the 2005 
company law revision. But in practice, many Chinese listed companies 
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choose to retain this requirement in the corporate charters, and this is 
also recommended by the 2016 Guidelines on Articles of Association in 
Article 96:'[t]he director is elected or replaced by a shareholders' 
meeting. His period of service is [number of years]. When a directors' 
period of service expires, he can be reelected. Before a directors'period of 
service expires, the shareholders'meeting cannot terminate his duties 
(73) 
without a reason… 
The seventh type is the "Golden Parachutes Provision", which is very 
common in U.S, this provision provides management of the company 
with generous compensation -in form of cash or securities, or the 
combination of both -if they are to be removed from office during 
their tenure. As such compensations are usually extremely bounty, the 
acquirer may think twice before they begin to change the board. 
The eighth type, which is very seldom and highly controversial m 
China, as observed by Professor Hui HUANG, I cal it "the hidden 
poison pil". As stated in corporate charter of Tecon Biology Co.Ltd -
an A-share listed company in Shenzhen stock exchange: when hostile 
takeover happens, and shareholder except the acquirer, who individually 
or collective hold 20% or more shares of the company, has the right to 
request, in writing, the board of directors to take defensive actions in 
response to the hostile takeover, so far as such defensive measure does 
not violate the law and regulations. According to this provision, the 
management of the board can take actions to frustrate the takeover 
(74) 
bids by simply a written request from any eligible shareholders. This 
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provision is highly controversial in that, the general meeting of 
shareholders usually has the primary power in adopting defensive 
measures, not a single shareholders and any shareholder group along. 
On the other hand, the constitution of the company is approved by the 
general meeting itself, therefore, such provision may have its legality 
for its existence. 
The Last type, is to require amending anti-takeover provisions need 
supermajority votes presented on the general meeting, which makes 
those defensive constitutions easy to impose, but hard to remove. 
In sum, anti-takeover constitutional provisions are either to install 
obstacles to the acquirer purchasing shares, or to set up barriers to the 
acquirer controlling board of directors. 
B. Ex post defenses in China 
In the past two decades, most target boards in China resisted hostile 
takeovers, although not al of them adopted defensive tactics. Here are 
several examples of takeovers with defensive responses. 
1. Shenzhen Baoan Group Co., Ltd VS Shanghai Y anzhong Industrial 
Co., Ltd 
The first hostile takeover in China can trace back to the early 1993. 
The Chinese securities market was established in the beginning of the 
1990s, and it was only less than a month when corporate bodies were 
allowed to open their account to invest in stock market in Shanghai 
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that this landmark hostile takeover in Chinese history happened. 
The hostile acquirer, Shenzhen Baoan Group Co., Ltd (hereinafter 
Bao an), consecutively acquired shares of the target company, Y anzhong 
Industrial Co., Ltd (hereinafter Yanzhong) through its three affiliated 
companies from September炉 1993.Within a month's time, Baoan had 
held approximately 20% shares of Yanzhong and become its largest 
shareholder. This event was a huge BOOM in Chinese securities market 
and the mass of people were provoked, considering Baoan's sneak attack 
contemptible and rude. Yanzhong claimed in media that the hostile 
takeover would endanger the emotional link of old shareholders and its 
(75) 
thousands of employees. 
Y anzhong Industry made a complaint to the CSRC and accused Baoan 
of violating the information disclosure requirement. According to 
Yanzhong, Baoan purchased those shares confidentially and didn't make 
reports and announcements as requested by the law before they already 
became the largest shareholder. Baoan even further acquired more 
shares simply ignoring the suspension requirement, as stipulated in 
Article 47 of the Interim Administrative Regulations on Share Issuing 
(76) 
and Trading. Yanzhong Industry also questioned the legality of the 
fund Baoan used to make the acquisition. The registered capital of 
Baoan was only 10 million RMB, and the bids was funded by bank 
loans, which was strictly prohibited in Chinese Law. 
The CSRC mediated the disputes between the two parties, and the share 
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acquisition was, surprisingly, upheld by CSRC. Baoan was fined 1 
million RMB for violating the reporting and announcement requirement 
(77) 
-a relative small price for breaking the law. Therefore, despite several 
other anti-takeover measures Y anzhong had adopted, the hostile 
acquirer finally obtained control of the target company after appointing 
two directors into the board. 
2. Dagang Oilfield Group Ltd VS Shanghai ACE Co., Ltd. 
In 1998, Dagang Oilfield Group Ltd (hereinafter Dagang) and its 
affiliated corporations collectively purchased 10.01% shares of Shanghai 
ACE Co., Ltd (hereinafter ACE), and the hostile acquirer intended to 
replace its board. After Dagang announced the bid, ACE subsequently 
amended its corporate charter for two times in May, 1999. 
The first arnendrnent required electing directors or supervisors conforms 
to a three step procedure: first, the board of directors shall consult 
with shareholders'opinion; second, the board screens the qualifications 
of the candidates; and third, the board put forward the final candidate 
list for approval. This requirement in fact empowered the board of ACE 
to remove whatever candidates they are not fond of. 
The second amendment largely increased the standards of the 
nomination right of shareholders -only those shareholders who 
individually or collectively hold more than 10% of the total shares for 
more than 180 days have the right to nominate, which deprived the 
acquirer of the right to replace the board. 
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In an attempt to nullify these amendments, Dagang invited many legal 
professionals to discuss the illegality of such anti-takeover provisions, 
and ACE also invited experts and professors to testify the validity of 
those anti-takeover provisions. Academics and practitioners had been 
debating the legitimacy of those amendments for several months. 
Finally, Dagang Oilfield filed a complaint to CSRC, who later granted 
the injunction of the revise of the corporate charter. Finally, the ACE 
management failed to entrench its power and lost control of the 
company. 
3. Shanghai Xinlv Fuxing City Development Co., Ltd VS Liaoning 
Jindi Construction Group Co., Ltd 
In 2002, Shanghai Xinlv Fuxing City Development Co., Ltd (hereinafter 
Xinlv) intended to take over Liaoning Jindi Construction Group Co., 
Ltd (hereinafter Jindi), this is one of the seldom case one could find in 
China, when the target company employed the "Scorch Earth" strategy 
-stripping out its valuable assets to make the target company less 
attractive. The target board also found their way to rejected the 
nomination of directors by the hostile acquirer. This takeover batter 
lasts for four years and Xinlv finally paved its way for the control of 
Jindi in 2006. 
4. Wanhe Group VS ST Meiya Co., Ltd. 
The target company -ST Meiya Co., Ltd (hereinafter Meiya) was in 
severe financial distress for more than 2 years. In 2003, its former 
controlling shareholder -Guangdong Heshan state asset regulator, 
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transferred its state shares in Meiya to Wanhe Group by agreement, 
without negotiating with the management. Wanhe then obtained 27.49% 
shares of Meiya at 1.0107RMB per share. This disclosed contract had 
aroused strong objection from the incumbent management, who claimed 
in the media and general meeting of shareholders that this share 
transfer was impairing long-term interest of the company, and the 
acquirer had no relevant experiences in running an entity far different 
(78) 
from its own business domam. Almost al other shareholders and 
employees of Meiya objected this share transfer. Under the pressure, 
Guangdong Heshan state asset regulator had to cancel its cooperation 
with Wanhe Group and negotiated with the Meiya management. 
5. GOME Electrical Appliances Holding Limited VS Sanlian 
Commercial Co.,Ltd. 
In February 2008, Longjidao Construction Limited Company (hereinafter 
Longjidao), a company of only 10 million registered capital, obtained 
10.9% shares of Sanlian Commercial Co.,Ltd (hereinafter Sanlian) 
through judicial auction in Shandong Province. Longjidao was further 
found out to be a'shadow'acquirer, and the real acquirer behind the 
curtain was GOME Electrical Appliances Holding Limited (hereinafter 
GOME) -the nationwide electronic device retail giant in China. GOME 
announced its takeover of Longjidao and thereby gained the control of 
the Sanlian. Sanlian then filed a lawsuit to the High Court of 
Shandong Province, claiming that the indirect takeover by GOME 
breached the information disclosure and suspension requirements. 
However, the case was rejected by the court, alleging that the lawsuit 
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was filed in a wrong procedure and did not fal in the criteria for case 
(79) 
acceptance. In the end, Sanlian was acquired by GOME. 
6. Maoye International Holdings Ltd VS Shenzhen International 
Enterprises Co., Ltd 
From November 7th to December 16th 2008, Maoye International 
Holdings Ltd (hereinafter Maoye) and its affiliations increased their 
shareholding in Shenzhen International Enterprises Co., Ltd (hereinafter 
Shenzhen International) to 10% of its total shares. Shenzhen 
International attempted to use a poison pil which including a share 
allotment plan and director nomination limitation to frustrate Maoye's 
attack. However, the second largest shareholder of Shenzhen 
International -Shenzhen Tefa Group abstained in the vote on the 
poison pil, and the poison pil didn't pass. Shenzhen International then 
organized the shareholder group to protest Maoye's hostile takeover, 
and at the end the takeover failed. 
Poison pils are hardly seen in Chinese takeover market. Many 
observers like me are stil wondering what would happen if the motion 
of the poison pil by Shenzhen International Enterprises was approval 
by the general meetings of shareholders, as poison pills with 
(80) 
discriminative effect seems to be prohibited in the company law. 
7. Baoneng Group VS Vanke Co., Ltd 
China Vanke Co., Ltd (hereinafter Vanke) is the leading real estate 
company in China, with its main business in real estate development 
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and property service. Vanke has covered 66 cities in mainland China by 
the end of 2015, and has now been involved in dozens of real estate 
development projects in Hong Kong, Singapore, San Francisco, New 
(81) 
York City and London. Baoneng Group (hereinafter Baoneng), also 
founded in Shenzhen, is much less known and much smaller in size than 
Vanke, but has a rather diversified business domain including real 
estate, finance, logistics, medical service, agriculture and so on. 
From July to December, 2015, Baoneng and its affiliations acting in 
concert consecutively acquired Vanke-A Share from the stock market. 
And by December 17th, 2015, Baoneng group collectively held 
approximately 24% of total shares of Vanke, exceeded the China 
Resources Corporation and became the largest shareholder. Baoneng 
funded its acquisition through issuing corporation bond and the highly-
(82) 
controversial Universal Life Insurance. 
Chairman of Vanke, Mr. Shi WANG declared Baoneng as an unwelcome 
person, and began taking defensive measures as response. China 
Resources Corporation whereafter increased its shares, but didn't 
surpass Baoneng's shareholding. On December 24th, Vanke annouced 
AnBang Insuance to be its white knight, but AnBang eventually didn't 
achieve enough shareholding. Lucky for Vanke, the staggered provision 
in its corporate charters made Baoneng Group impossible to fully con-
(83) 
trol the board, at least temporarily. 
From December 21st 2015, Vanke-A share was suspended for trading for 
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several months. On March 13t¥ 2016, Vanke suddenly in the annual 
company report announced its memo on major asset transaction with 
Shenzhen Metro -another white knight for Vanke instead of the 
previous one. But only four days later, China Resources Corporation, 
who has supported Vanke unconditionally for the past decades, publicly 
objected Vanke's cooperation with Shenzhen Memo and claiming the 
management had bypassed the board of directors to reach this 
agreement. On June 17th, the Vanke board approved the cooperation 
with Shenzhen Metro, despite al three directors from China Resource 
Cooperation objected it. China Resource Cooperation subsequently claim 
the board meeting had procedural irregularities. China Resource 
Corporation invited many legal professionals and academic scholars to 
issue opinions about the illegitimacy of Vanke's Board meeting. And 
although experts had "in accordance" claimed that the board meeting 
(84) 
procedure was illegal thus its legal impact should be nullified. No 
decisive conclusion was drawn from the CSRC or the court. 
On July 19t¥ Vanke filed complaints to CSRC and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange, alleging that the funds Baoneng used to finance its 
acquisition is illegal. But CSRC later upheld the validity of funds in 
(85) 
Baoneng's wealth management scheme. In August 2016, the takeover 
dispute had a twist, when Evergrande Group -another Chinese real 
. (86) 
estate giant announced its participation into the takeover battle. 
On December 3rd, 2016, chairman of CSRC, Mr. LIU Shiyu condemned 
"barbaric" leveraged company buy-outs by some asset managers using 
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illegal funds. Liu said China's capital markets had seen a series of " 
abnormal phenomena" lately, challenging the bottom line of China's 
(87) 
financial law and regulations. After Liu's Speech, Baoneng Group had 
been laying low ever since. 
On January 12th, Huarun transferred al its Vanke A-share to Shenzhen 
Metro thorough share transfer agreement. One day later, the 
Evergrande Group made an announcement stating that they have no 
intention further acquire Vanke's share. Baoneng Group and Shenzhen 
Metro al made conservative statement that "for their strategy on 
development, it's too early to exclude the possibility that they may 
(88) 
further increase their shares in Vanke in the next 12 months". 
The Vanke and Baoneng dispute is stil going on. It's very hard for us 
to predict how it will end. But one thing is for sure, the Chinese 
regulatory framework is far from enough to provide certainty in 
takeover issues. 
8. Other takeover cases in China 
The Chinese securities market has grown rapidly from its establishment 
in the early 1990s. There were several hostile attempts during the past 
two decades, some of them succeeded, while others failed. Except the 
cases we mentioned above, there were other examples worth noting. 
Most target companies adopted defensive tactics as response, but the 
some of them didn't. But it's highly possible because of such defensive 
(89) 
tactics were now known to the public or so. 
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In 1996, Guanzhou Sanxin Industry attempted to takeover Shanghai 
Shenhua Shareholdings Co., Ltd, but was defeated by the white knight. 
In 1999, Guangzhou Tongbaihui Service Co., Ltd's hostile takeover of 
Shandong Shengli Corporation Limited was defeated by the dominate 
shareholder of Shandong Shengli through increasing its shareholding. 
In 2001, three takeover attempted were seen in China. First, Huajian 
Electronic Co., Ltd tried to obtain control of Jinan Baihuo Co., Ltd, 
however, the takeover was rejected by the board of directors of the 
target company, who defeated the acquirer by passing a board 
resolution. 
The second case was Yuxin Group takeovers Founder Y anzhong 
Technology Group. Yuxing Group become Founder Y anzhong 
Technology Group Co., Ltd's largest shareholder by purchasing shares 
from the secondary market. The acquirer prepared to submit a proposal 
to the general meeting, in order to select their directors into the board. 
The corporate charter authorized the incumbent board to review the 
directors, but the standards and requirements were very vague and 
ambiguous. As the incumbent management and the largest shareholder 
could not settle their disputes, the acquirer attempted to call on an 
interim shareholder meeting, which was frustrated by the incumbent 
management by filing a lawsuit to the court, claiming the call on 
interim shareholder meeting didn't follow the due process. 
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The third case in 2001 was Shanghai High Resolution Digital Vision 
System Co., Ltd's takeover of Founder Yanzhong Technology Group 
Co., Ltd, and the latter frustrated the takeover bid by increasing 
(90) 
shareholding. 
V. Rethinking Chinese Legal Framework: A Comparative 
Perspective 
It is submitted that Chinese takeover law first borrowed experiences 
from England, but not entirely. CSRC's Audit Committee of Mergers 
and Acquisitions is the Chinese version of (although not as powerful as) 
the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers of England, and the rules in 
Chinese takeover law bear lots of resemblance to (although not as 
thorough as) the British City Code on Takeovers and Mergers. 
However, the Chinese law interpretation process and enforcement is 
very different from the U.K, and with the court from time to time 
participate in takeover issues, it's very hard to say China and U.K 
shares legal framework in takeover issues in common. 
As we mentioned above, the Chinese takeover defense regulation is 
mainly consisted of five types of rules: first, shareholders as the 
primary decision-making authority in corporate governance, as 
stipulated in 2014 Company Law; second, ban and prohibition on certain 
types of defensive measures, as stipulated in 2014 Company Law and 
2014 Securities Law; third, a Chinse mandatory bid rule, as stipulated 
in 2014 Securities Law and 2014 Administrative Rules on Acquisition; 
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fourth, fiduciary duty of the management, as stipulated in 2014 
Administrative Rules on Acquisition and 2016 Guidelines on Articles of 
Association; fifth, the Chinese version of board neutrality rule, as 
stipulated in 2014 Administrative Rules on Acquisition. The China 
Security Regulatory Commission is the main regulator in Chinese 
Securities Market and has the ultimate and exclusive right over 
takeover disputes as a technocrat. CSRC established he Audit 
Committee of Mergers and Acquisitions which consists of related 
experts and professionals on a part-time basis to deal with takeover 
relative affairs. 
Therefore, in form and in its concrete rules, the modern Chinese 
Framework is mixture of similar regulations in U.S, U.K and E.U. We 
have given considerable paragraphs in our takeover related laws to 
define and address fiduciary duties. Also, those key elements from 
European Takeover Directive -mandatory bid, board neutrality role and 
breakthrough role -are al observed, although in different forms, in 
Chinese takeover regulatory framework. It seems that Chinese policy 
makers were trying really hard to make sure the Chinese takeover law 
is thorough and embracive, but in practice, many serious problems 
occur. 
A. Fiduciary Duty and Board Neutrality Rule -cannot have both 
As a Chinese proverb goes, you cannot have fish and bear paw at the 
same time. Fiduciary Duty and Board Neutrality Rule is the fish and 
bear paw in takeover regulation. 
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Fiduciary Duty as its core to U.S takeover legal framework is like 
Board Neutrality Rule being the centerpiece in European approach. In 
U.S takeover regulatory system where highlight the importance of 
fiduciary duty, we found that it is the court, rather than any other 
regulatory authority, that deals with the most essential business in 
takeover disputes. When court has developed a mature and stable 
system -the modified business judgement rule -to address directors' 
duty in takeovers, other laws seem to be less important. In the 
European approach, when Board Neutrality Rule were enforced as 
mandatory, for instance, in U.K, then the court lost its primacy in 
takeover regulation. 
We don't usually see SEC deals with takeover cases in U.S, nor do we 
notice any court participation in U.K. The truth is, Fiduciary Duty and 
Board Neutrality Rule represent two very different paths in takeover 
regulation. We can only have "either of them" but not "both of them". 
The Fiduciary Duty path of U.S centers the court in dealing with 
takeover issues, it favors the primacy of the board of directors over the 
will of the shareholders. And directors can adopt defensive measures 
without the approval from general meetings of shareholders. To some 
extent, the U.S system has inhibiting effects on hostile takeovers where 
management of the company enjoys sense of security. And it is the 
directors, not the shareholders, have the decision-making power in 
takeovers. 
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The Board Neutrality Rule path of E.U or U.K requires directors of the 
board take no action when hostile takeover happens unless the 
shareholders say otherwise, which gives shareholder the primary power 
to review the merits of the offer. Directors of the board cannot take 
any defensive measures that may frustrate the offer bid. To a certain 
degree, the E.U or U.K approach has promotive effect on hostile 
takeovers where acquirers face lower uncertainty in takeovers. And it is 
the shareholders, not the directors, have the primary authority in 
takeovers. 
We cannot inhibit takeovers from happening while at the same time 
promote it, just like we cannot empower shareholders and directors 
simultaneously. Choosing between those two paths sets the keynote of 
climate of takeover regulations in China -are we restraining takeovers 
from happening, giving more sense of safety to corporate 
managements? Or should we facilitate hostile takeovers and benefit 
from better allocation of resources and synergy effect of affiliations? 
This might be the most fundamental question policy makers have to 
face when choosing its future path. We will address this problem again 
in the next chapter, but it is very clear that Fiduciary Duty and Board 
Neutrality Rule are opposite to each other and it is ridiculous to see 
them both exist in one legal jurisprudence. 
B. Chinese Fiduciary Duty -too general and too broad 
Article 8 in 2014 Administrative Rules on Acquisition provides the 
general rule on directors'fiduciary duty. Article 148 of 2014 Chinese 
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Company Law defined fiduciary duty as duty of loyalty and duty of 
care. Then, duty of loyalty was enumerated in several prohibitive 
stipulations in Article 148 and Article 149 in Company Law. The 
Company Law does not elaborately define the "duty of care", it only 
reveals the consequence when directors, supervisors or senior managers 
have to afford when they fail to obey so in Article 150. And Article 98 
of 2016 Guidelines on Articles of Association provides certain examples 
of how directors and management could fulfil their duty of care to the 
company. 
Despite so many words and paragraphs were used to clarify what fidu-
ciary duty is in Chinese corporate governance, the fiduciary duty is stil 
too vague and blur for legal practitioners. All those articles in Chinese 
law used general terms such as "treat al the purchasers…in a fair 
manner", "protecting interests of a company and its shareholders", 
"should not…cause improper obstacle to takeovers" or "should not cause 
damages to the lawful rights of the said company or its shareholders". 
Those general term are necessary, especially for emergencies and new 
situations. However, without detailed, definitive and deterministic 
clauses to support its back, those general regulations alone left many 
critical questions in takeovers unsolved, and thereby caused mass 
(91) 
uncertainty in Chinese takeover markets. 
For instance, what manner is "fair" and what is not? What obstacle is 
proper and what is not? How to define the lawful rights of a company? 
And how to define the lawful rights of shareholders? Answers to those 
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questions are critical, in order to eliminate uncertainties in Chinese 
market. However, another even more important question is that, who is 
responsible for the ultimate answers to those questions in China, the 
court, or CSRC? The U.S approach is somehow inspirational to this 
question. 
From the U.S experience, we know that clarifying fiduciary duty is 
never easy. Instead of writing down simple principles of fiduciary duty 
one by one, the Delaware court employed a two-part reasonableness-
based tests, to determine whether it is legitimate for the board to take 
defensive measures. Under this test, the defendant -directors of the 
board, was required to prove that: first, they had reasonable ground to 
believe that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed 
because of another person's stock ownership, and; second, the defensive 
measure which they were taking was reasonable in relation to the 
(92) 
threat posed. 
Compare to Chinese practice, this two-part reasonableness-based test is 
definitely better because: first, it is more flexible in defining fiduciary 
duty; second, it is more stable and produced more certainty. 
The inclination of Delaware courts is to favor the primacy of the board 
of directors over the will of the shareholders. This inclination provides 
high level of certainty to the board and they thereby adopt defensive 
measures as respond to unwilling takeovers confidently. In China, 
expressions and interpretations in Chinese Law on fiduciary duty are 
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too general and too simple, as we have seen in many cases above, 
almost al takeover defenses adopted by the management were regarded 
as "controversial" with different "reasons", even when hostile takeovers 
in China are usually deemed "immoral". 
In the U.S system, it is the court that governs the most essential part 
of takeover activity, while SEC only deals with procedural issues. If 
China choose to adopt an American approach, then court must actively 
participate in takeover disputes -not in a way Delaware courts did, but 
at least provide certain and clear interpretations and guidance on 
takeover law. 
C. Chinese Board Neutrality Rule -too minute and too narrow 
Article 33 of 2014 Administrative Rules on Acquisition provides 
substantive guidance for Board Neutrality Rule. "…During the period 
after the announcement of a takeover bid and before the completion of 
the takeover bid, target company management .without the ratification 
of the general shareholders'meeting, should not cause major impacts on 
the assets, liabilities, entitlements or business performances of the 
target company by disposing of assets, engaging in external 
investments, adjusting the main businesses, providing guarantees or 
(93) 
loans and others." 
The principle of this term was supposed to be "for management of the 
target company, without shareholders approve, no defensive measures 
should be taken". However, as we have seen in article, in its effort to 
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"clarify" board's duty in takeovers, the law maker on the contrary put 
obscured "limitations" on board's role of "not doing something". 
First of al, "During the period after the announcement of a takeover 
bid and before the completion of the takeover bid…", means this article 
does not apply to defensives measures employed "before the 
announcement of a takeover bid". Second, "should not cause major 
impacts on the assets, liabilities, entitlements or business performances 
of the target company…", means this article does not apply to takeover 
defenses that "do not cause major impacts on the assets, liabilities, 
entitlements or business performances of the target company". In other 
words, under Article 3, as far as defensive measures do not cause 
major impact on the target company, or such measures were taken 
before the announcement of the bid, then the management do not need 
shareholders'approval for taking such defenses. 
Therefore, instead of prevent the management from taking defensive 
measures, Article 33 provides the board with a loophole, through which 
the board could circumvent shareholder approve and adopt certain types 
of defensive measures. When fiduciary duty in Chinese law seems to be 
too broad and too general, the board neutrality rule seems way over 
specified. 
The European Directive on Board Neutrality Rule is elaborated, but it's 
key point is quite clear and unequivocal. According to Article 9, once 
the board are aware of the offer bids, it should not take any actions 
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that may frustrate the acquisition activity before obtaining 
authorization from shareholders, except finding alternative potential 
(94) 
off eror to join the bid. Article 9 (1) through (6) has thoroughly 
considered the time span and al different kinds of situations, also the 
procedure of obtaining authorization. If China is to adopt the European 
path of takeover regulation, then the Directive provides a very good 
example of real Board Neutrality Rule. 
D. Chinese Mandatory Bid Rule -too rigid and too inflexible 
Article 88 in the 2014 Securities Law lays the ground of Chinese 
Mandatory Bid Rule.'[w]here through securities trading on a stock 
exchange, the shareholding of an investor, or the deemed joint-
shareholding of an investor and others in virtue of agreements or other 
arrangements, has reached 30% of the issued shares of a listed company, 
if further acquisition is to be pursued, a tender of er of acquisition shall 
be launched pursuant to law to all of the shareholders of the listed 
(95) " 
company for acquiring al or part of the shares of the listed company. 
Therefore, the Mandatory Bid requirement in China is mandatory in 
that when purchasing shares more than the 30% threshold, further 
share acquisition should be undergone through the form of a tender 
offer. But in European Directive, the Mandatory Bid Rule is mandatory 
in that when purchasing shares over certain threshold, the acquirer has 
to purchase al outstanding shares through offer bids. Therefore, the 
Chinese version of the Mandatory Bid Rule is less "mandatory" in 
content. 
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When European countries adopt the Mandatory Bid Rule, they aim to 
offer protection for minority shareholders by ensuring they have been 
treated in the same manner as the blockholders, who commonly existed 
in European companies. Most Chinese listed companies have a similarly 
concentrated ownership just like European companies, hence it is 
reasonable to adopt the same strict Mandatory Bid Rule in China. 
However, as far as the acquirer is free to choose the amount of shares 
he wants to purchase, the minority shareholders face certain possibility 
of being squeezed out through future coercive deals. 
The threshold of the Chinese Mandatory Bid Rule is 30%, which is 
exactly the same as in U.K. However, the U.K adopts a Mandatory Bid 
Rule with 30% threshold is because 30% shareholding in U.K is normally 
enough for taking control, which is not the same case in China. 
Normally, controlling shareholder in Chinese listed companies hold 
more than 30% of total shares, therefore 30% may be grossly inadequate 
to secure control. The fact is, in China, there are companies with 
extremely high level of ownership concentration such as national banks 
and insurance companies; and there are a few companies with very 
dispersed ownership concentration, therefore, we should learn from the 
European Directive and give corporations the power to settle the 
threshold for themselves in their company constitution, otherwise the 
Chinese Mandatory Bid Rule is simply too rigid and too inflexible to 
adapt for the needs of Chinese market. 
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E. Power Allocation in Chinese Takeover Regime: Clear in Theory 
but Ambiguous in Practice 
Company Law, in whatever countries, has certain inclination of power 
allocation. The U.S law, for instance, directors of the board have 
preponderant power of corporate issues. While in most European 
countries, shareholders are given more primacy in corporate decision-
making. 
The Chinese Company Law has clear-cut provisions that empower 
shareholders with more decision-making power, while the board acts as 
its executor in major decisions. In areas of takeovers, Article 8 of 2014 
Administrative Rules on Acquisition clearly states that "…target 
company management・shouldnot cause damages to the lawful rights 
of ・itsshareholders". Then, what is the lawful rights of shareholders 
stated in the company law that should be protected specifically during 
a takeover? 
The first and most important lawful right of shareholders in takeovers 
is to vote on major issues of the corporation. Article 38 of Company 
Law states that "[t]he shareholders'meeting shall exercise the following 
functions: (1) Determining the company's operational guidelines and 
investment plans…(5) Deliberating and approving annual financial 
budget plans and final account plans of the company…(6) Deliberating 
and approving company profit distribution plans and loss recovery 
plans…(8) Making resolutions about the issuance of corporate bonds… 
(96) 
(10) Revising the bylaw of the company…" Therefore, almost al major 
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issues have to be discussed in the general meetings of shareholders and 
the board should not deliberately deprive shareholders of the opportu-
nity to discuss the merits of those issues. 
The second lawful right of shareholders in takeovers is the right to 
elect directors into the board or to dismiss the board. Article 38 of 
Company Law states that'[t]he shareholders'meeting shall exercise the 
fallowing functions: … (2) Electing and changing the directors and 
supervisors assumed by non-representatives of the employees and 
(91) 
deciding the matters relating to their salaries and compensations・
Shareholders have the fundamental right to determine who is suitable 
for the seat in the board of directors. 
The third lawful right of shareholders in takeovers is to call on an 
interim meeting. Article 40 of Company Law states that''[t]he 
shareholders'meetings shall be classified into regular meetings and 
interim meetings…The regular meetings shall be timely held according 
to the bylaw. Where an interim meeting is proposed by the shareholders 
representing 1/10 of the voting rights or more, or by directors 
representing 1/3 of the voting rights or more, or by the board of 
supervisors, or by the supervisors of the company with no board of 
• (98) 
supervisors, an interim meeting shall be held ". So shareholders 
representing 10% voting rights or more are granted the right to cal on 
an interim meeting. 
The fourth right of shareholders in takeovers is to put forward interim 
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proposals before the general meetings of shareholders. Article 103 of 
Company Law stipulates that'Tt]he shareholders separately or 
aggregately holding 3% or more of the shares of the company may put 
forward a written interim proposal to the board of directors 10 days 
before a shareholders'assembly is held. The board of directors may 
notify other shareholders within 2 days and submit the interim proposal 
to the meeting of the shareholders'assembly for deliberation. The 
contents of an interim proposal shall fall within the scope to be decided 
by the shareholders'assembly, and the interim proposal shall have a 
(99) 
clear topic for discussion and matters to be decided". 
In sum, the right to vote on major issues, the right to elect or change 
directors of the board, the right to cal on an interim meeting and the 
right to put forward interim proposals are the four fundamental rights 
granted to the shareholders by the company law, hence those 
mandatory rules should not fal into the scope of corporate autonomy 
in takeovers. However, in practice, those four lawful rights of 
shareholders are not well protected in takeover activities. 
The first type of ex-ante anti-takeover provision in China, as we 
mentioned above, stipulates that anyone holds more than 5% or 10% 
share of the company has to get approvals from the directors of the 
board or general meetings of shareholders to acquire more shares, 
otherwise those shares acquired carries no director nominating right or 
voting right. This is a blatant contravene of shareholders'fundamental 
right to vote and nominate directors. Moreover, provisions raising the 
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substantive standard for shareholders to nominate directors of the 
board, are al virtually limiting shareholders fundamental right to vote 
or nominate. The most absurd thing of these anti-takeover provisions is 
that shareholders have to get boards'nod for the right to vote and 
nominate directors; even worse, such provisions are widely adopted in 
Associations of Chinese listed companies. 
Another quite common anti-takeover provision is to empower the board 
with the authority to review new directors nominated by shareholders, 
this is plausible at first sight as it could prevent shareholders from 
abusing their powers. But if the provision is distorted in such a way 
when the ultimate decision power of directorship appointment falls in 
the hands to the board of directors, such provisions are widely used by 
the management to entrench their control of the company. As directors 
review shareholders'nomination first, and then bring proposals to the 
general meeting, theoretically there are chances that shareholders' 
nominations are never approved by the board review, which has become 
a common phenomenon in recent years. Therefore, in my humble 
opinion, it's ok to review new directors nominated by shareholders, but 
the review standard must be clear-cut and not draconian. 
And the most controversial anti-takeover provision, as we mentioned 
above, enables directors to take defensive measures simply on a written 
request from a large shareholder. This provision directly transfers the 
power of adopting defensive measures from the general meeting to any 
large shareholders other than the acquirer, which blatantly ignores 
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minority shareholders'opinion and contravenes the Company Law. 
Meanwhile, some post ante takeover defenses in practice, also turned 
deaf ear to shareholders'fundamental rights. 
In the Yuxin Group VS Founder Yanzhong case of 2001, shareholder's 
right to cal on an interim meeting was not respected, nor was the 
right to nominate their candidates for directors into the board. In the 
Xinlv VS Jindi case, the "Scorch Earth" strategy employed by Jindi in 
its attempt to hit off Xinlv was a complete violation of the Chinese 
Broad Neutrality rule. And the management of Jindi found their way 
to rejected the nomination of directors by the hostile acquirer. In the 
Baoan VS Yanzhong case, the CSRC upheld the validity of share 
purchase of the acquirer even though it clearly breached the reporting 
and announcement requirement. 
The CSRC failed to take action against the adoption of certain takeover 
defenses which blatantly violate relevant laws. Even worse, when 
controversial events occurred, the court failed to provide enough 
interpretation or guidance on the concept of fiduciary duties in the 
takeover cases. The High Court of Shandong Province simply rejected 
the Sanlian's litigation accusing GOME breaching procedural 
requirements. 
As CSRC and the court being unable to provide firm and sound legal 
guidance, experts and scholars become another group of forces to fil up 
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the vacuum. As we saw in the previous cases, in Dagang VS ACE case, 
legal professionals were invited to discuss the legality of such anti-
takeover provisions; also, in Baoneng VS Vanke Case, experts and 
scholars gathered together to discuss whether Vanke's directors meeting 
violated certain procedural requirements. 
In short, the takeover regulation in China is problematic both in terms 
of substantive law and enforcement, which causes the imbalance of 
power allocation in takeovers as well as uncertainty among the market. 
VI. Suggestions for Improvement 
A. A Legal System That Favors Takeovers -E.U Approach over U.S 
System 
Takeover law should maximize shareholders'benefit. This opinion is 
firmly grounded in that U.S takeover law, European Directive and 
Chinese company law al have relevant general clauses. Besides, such 
provisions on shareholders'protection can be found in local laws of very 
state in U.S and every member state in the European Union. Generally 
speaking, under any legal jurisdiction, mechanisms that facilitating 
takeovers usually benefit company value and thereby increase 
shareholders'welfare for four reasons. 
First of al, acquirers plan to take over a company because they believe 
they can better utilize the resources of the target company, at least 
better than the incumbent management. Indeed, the company value will 
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(100) 
rocket up if its potentiality is released out by better management. The 
acquirers are willing to pay more than the market price simply because 
they saw a better future of the target company, and shareholders can 
enjoy the premium paid by the acquirers in advance without taking any 
risks. 
Second, the synergy effect in takeovers increases the company value 
tremendously. The total value of two companies merged with each other 
is far bigger than their individual value combined, because of economies 
(101) 
of scale and economies of scope. Also, excessive management can be cut 
off to further reduce expense. 
Third, when management faces the opportunity of being replaced, they 
tend to work harder to maximize shareholders'benefits. In other words, 
corporate governance improves simply because of potential takeovers. 
Management have to decrease waste and inefficiency and keep their 
stock price high as much as they could, because poor-management 
usually gives rise to decrease in stock price and thereby makes the 
target company more vulnerable. 
Fourth, takeovers make capital market more efficient. In a highly-
competitive market, when a company's stock price is underestimated, 
acquirers usually rush on like a swarm of hornets, until the market 
(102) 
price reflect its true value. 
In China, the corporate governance problem is especially severe, 
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compared to its counterpart in American or Europe. 
The No.1 corporate governance problem in China is the agency costs of 
controlling blockholder and insiders'control because of no functional 
proprietor of the state-owned shares. A very large proportion of shares 
in Chinese listed companies is state-owned shares, however, the State-
owned Asset Supervision and Administration Commission performed 
badly over the past two decades, and the state-owned largest 
shareholder as the supervision entity of the management is virtually 
(103) 
non-existent, and insider control problem is very serious. 
Moreover, the supervisory board and independent director system 
(104) 
functioned awfully in China. Due to poor institutional transplantation, 
it is almost impossible for the supervisory board to "supervise" the 
management, and independent directors in China are no more than 
"rubber stamp" of the board of directors. 
Under these circumstances, takeovers, especially hostile takeovers, may 
be a cure to Chinese corporate governance, especially when China 
gradually open its capital markets. In order to sustain growth, the 
Chinese government adopted supply-side reform to vitalize Chinese 
enterprises. Therefore, the whole industries are in desperate need of 
takeovers and reorganizations to better utilize social resources. In other 
words, a legal framework that facilitate takeovers is more optimal for 
China. 
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The E.U approach in nature better facilitates takeovers than the U.S 
approach, from this aspect, China should adopt a "board neutrality 
rule" centered takeover regime and discard the "fiduciary duty" centered 
regulatory approach. 
To adopt the E.U approach, first of al, the Administrative Rules on 
Acquisition of Listed Company should make it clear that without 
shareholder approval, the board of directors should not take any 
defensive measures. This is not to suggest a blanket ban on al takeover 
defenses, but the shareholders have the final say to adopt ex post 
defenses. 
Second, fundamental rights of shareholders as stipulated in the 
Company Law should be respected in takeover activities. Shareholders' 
right to vote on major issues, to elect and nominate directors of the 
board and to cal on interim meetings should not be violated by any 
means. 
Third, although most contents in the E.U Directive have promotive 
effects for takeovers, the Mandatory Bid Rule is an exemption. The U.S 
freestyle is even better than the Chinse Semi Mandatory Bid Rule. 
Therefore, the Mandatory Bid Rule should be abolished in China. 
B. A Modified Chinese Board Neutrality Rule 
We mentioned the four benefits to the market and shareholders of 
takeovers above: better allocation of resources, synergy effects between 
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cooperation, better corporate governance and more precise market 
estimation. Then, why should the law intervene in takeovers? One 
answer to this question is because of the naturally existed conflicts of 
interests, or in other words, agency costs, between different 
participants of takeovers. 
The first agency cost exists between the management and shareholders. 
When takeover emerges, it brings premiums for shareholders, which is 
good for them. But this is definitely a nightmare for the incumbent 
management, who will almost absolutely be replaced if takeover 
succeeds. Therefore, instead of thinking what's best for the company 
and shareholders, the management intends to think for themselves at 
this time and they would find every room to out-maneuver the 
acquirers by adopting defensive measures. If the management 
successfully frustrate the offer bids, the shareholders won't enjoy the 
premiums of the offer and if the takeover is really a value-adding one, 
the board of directors are entrenching their control at the cost of better 
management and long-term revenue of the company. 
The second agency cost exists between the dominant shareholders and 
minority shareholders. There are two kinds of agency costs among 
dominant shareholders and minority shareholders. The first one is, 
when a company has a controlling shareholder, this shareholder usually 
also controls the board using his overwhelming voting rights. Hence, 
when takeovers are imminent, this dominant shareholder can cut deals 
with the acquirer, offers them his portion of the total shares and saves 
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the acquirers the trouble of public offering, by doing this the 
controlling shareholder enjoys the premiums of share prices that do not 
have to share with other shareholders. The second situation is much 
worse, when a dominant shareholder exploits company resources at the 
expenses of minority shareholders, this dominant shareholder and the 
board represents this shareholder do not want to lose control of the 
company. Therefore, they tend to hit back those potential reformers of 
the company who may eventually bring good to shareholders of the 
company as whole. Also, by frustrating the acquirers'attempt, the 
dominant shareholder closed the gate for minority shareholders to cash 
out at a reasonable market price, or to have a better management of 
the company in the future. 
In sum, the ultimate goal of the Company Law is to reduce the agency 
costs that come with opportunism. Those agency costs usually come 
into being between: 1. shareholders and the management; 2. minority 
shareholders and controlling shareholders. 
In fact, different jurisprudence has different types and levels of agency 
costs. In countries where share ownership structure is dispersed, the 
agency costs between minority shareholders and controlling 
shareholders are almost non-existent, but the shareholders and 
management agency costs are relatively high. On the contrary, in 
countries where share ownership structure is concentrated, the agency 
costs between shareholders and the management are low, but minority 
shareholders and controlling shareholders'agency costs are hi嘉
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Thus, the Company Law in different countries have different goals and 
systematic design. When the U.S law are designed to mitigate the 
agency costs between shareholders and management by a Business 
Judgement Rule centered legal system, countries with concentrated 
ownership structures like China and most Member States of the 
European Union deals with the agency costs between minority 
shareholders and controlling shareholders. 
We illustrate that China should take an E.U path and highlight the 
Board Neutrality Rule as the center of its takeover regulatory 
framework. However, the naturally high agency costs among minority 
shareholders and controlling shareholders determined that a "broad" 
Board Neutrality Rule is grossly inadequate. 
In my humble opinion, a "modified" Board Neutrality Rule should be 
applied in China. In the normal Board Neutrality Rule, when takeover 
happens, directors of the board should not take any actions that may 
frustrate the offer bid unless the general meeting of shareholders say 
otherwise. In my "modified" Board Neutrality Rule, when takeovers are 
imminent, directors of the board should not take any actions that may 
frustrate the offer bid unless the majority of minority shareholders say 
otherwise. Hence, it is not for the general meeting, but rather, the 
minority shareholders that have the final say of takeover defenses. 
As ownership structure is different from companies to companies, the 
corporate charter should have clear standards of "minority 
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shareholders". On the other hand, if the minority shareholders really 
only make up an extremely small portion of company shareholders, 
then it is not appropriate for a group of people this small to decide 
such major issues in takeovers, thus it should be the non-controlling 
shareholder, as well as the minority shareholders as a whole to decide 
whether takeover defenses should be adopted. And the corporate charter 
also has to define the shareholding threshold of controlling 
shareholders. 
This "modified" Board Neutrality Rule has three advantages. First of 
1 a , itlargely mitigates the agency costs between minority shareholders 
and controlling shareholders. Second, it encourages takeovers from 
happening as the adoption of defensive measures are more difficult than 
before. Third, it benefits the shareholders as a whole by benefiting 
directly from the real "shareholders'rights". 
The disadvantages of this "modified" Board Neutrality Rule is also 
obvious. First, the minority shareholders are usually very dispersed, 
and it's very hard to gather them together to vote. Also, the minority 
shareholders have litle knowledge and information about the company 
business, and it's difficult for them to make really splendid decision. 
Vote Proxy mechanism seems to be a solution to these two 
disadvantages, but it also brings new agency costs between the 
minority shareholder and the proxy entity. 
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C. Discriminate Fund Resources in Takeovers 
The major concerns on Chinese takeover regulation nowadays, are not 
only on the agency costs. The focus in 2017 is the source of the funds 
used in takeovers. Most of takeovers in China are leveraged buyout, 
which means the funds to acquire the target company are borrowed 
elsewhere to meet the cost of acquisition. "The assets of the company 
being acquired are often used as collateral for the loans, along with the 
assets of the acquiring company. The purpose of leveraged buyouts is 
to allow companies to make large acquisitions without having to 
(106) 
commit a lot of capital." 
Currently in there is no substantive rules on requirement of takeover's 
funding source in Chinese Company Law, Securities Law or 
Administrative Rules on Acquisition of Listed Company. The CSRC, on 
the other hand, publically expressed its concerns on the sources of the 
money repeatedly those two years. 
The highlight case of Baoneng taking over Vanke and Baoneng taking 
over Geli, majority of the funds used by the acquirer are leveraged 
capital, and more specifically, from insurance funds. CSRC's discontent 
with takeovers in China is mainly because the leverage ratio of some 
takeovers are amazingly high. And CSRC has taken numerous measures 
to deal with this problem. 
In my humble opinion, the best way to regulate the venture capital in 
takeover market is to allow management adopt defensive measures to 
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acquisitions funded by high-leverage ratio capital. And CSRC's only 
participation in this is to decide whether the leverage ratio of the 
capital is too high. 
When faced with takeovers, management of the company can make 
complaints to CSRC or the stock exchanges, who then decides if the 
leverage ratio of the acquirer is too high. If so, the management of the 
company can take defensive measures without the approval from 
shareholders. And if not, the management must strictly obey the 
modified Board Neutrality Rule. 
By discriminating different funding source of the acquisition, the 
market itself put an end to exaggerated leverage buy-outs without 
hampering good takeovers from happening. And it is the CSRC or 
stock exchanges that decides the merit of the takeovers, not the 
management who is naturally faced with conflicts of interests. 
Conclusion 
Two major problems in Chinese takeover legal framework are as 
follows. First, directors'fiduciary duty should not co-exists with Board 
Neutrality Rule within the same jurisprudence. Second, when Chinese 
Company Law is shareholder-centered in theory, the fundamental rights 
of the shareholders are not well protected in takeovers domain. 
The E. U approach is rnore pro-shareholders and pro-takeovers m 
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nature, thus better fits the need of China's ongoing supply-side reform 
and the cal to protect shareholders. China should center Board 
Neutrality Rule as its basic principle in takeover law, and abandon the 
Mandatory Bid Rule which largely increase the costs of takeovers. 
Moreover, the Board Neutrality Rule should be further modified 
considering the agency costs between minority shareholders and 
controlling shareholders are usually high in Chinese listed companies. 
In the normal Board Neutrality Rule, when takeover happens, directors 
of the board should not take any actions that may frustrate the offer 
bid unless the general meeting of shareholders say otherwise. In the 
"modified" Board Neutrality Rule, when takeovers are imminent, 
directors of the board should not take any actions that may frustrate 
the offer bid unless the majority of minority shareholders say 
otherwise. And corporate charters of listed companies should have their 
own clear-cut standards of "minority shareholders". 
In China, the source of the funds in takeovers are the main concern of 
regulatory authorities, and it is submitted that extremely high-ratio 
leverage capital is detriment to the industries as a whole. When faced 
with takeovers, management of the company can make complaints to 
CSRC or the stock exchanges, who then decides if the leverage ratio of 
the acquirer is too high. If so, the management of the company can 
take defensive measures without the approval from shareholders. And if 
not, the management should strictly obey the modified Board 
Neutrality Rule. 
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